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Introduction 
A resemblance1 between positions held by Duhem and Quine has led to the conjunction of 
their names: one speaks of “Duhem-Quine”2 (or the other way around). Whether the 
affinity—amid many differences3 of period, provenance, profession, subject-matter, style 
and generality—is enough to justify enduring matrimony is debatable, but not the issue 
here.4 Quine’s position is famously expressed in “Two dogmas of empiricism”; it was by 
disputing the second5 that he wound up in the company of Duhem. But there is also the 
first, the analytic-synthetic distinction;6 Quine claims they are the same, and indeed 
contests both together. 
 With resources hinted at in different ways by both Duhem and Quine, it will be argued 
that some of their misgivings about empirical confirmation, or crucial experiments, may be 
exaggerated7 or unfounded; and that such experiments, suitably conceived, can give good 
meaning to empirical sentences. With appropriate meanings one can then wonder about 
synonymy and analyticity. 
 Crucial experiments will be taken to be not only those that discriminate between 
theories, but also those that test a single theory or statement. Absolute cruciality is an 
unattainable Platonic limit; but the approach proposed here allows us to come close enough 
to speak of “crucial experiments” tout court—rather than just, say, “very crucial 
experiments.” For it can be misleading not to represent significant differences in degree as 
differences in kind (and hence, for instance, not to call the unlikeliest events “impossible,” 
to differentiate clearly from those that are only moderately unlikely). 
                                                 
1 On this resemblance, as recognized by Quine, see the footnote on p.41 of Quine (1953), footnote 7 on p.67 
of Quine (1960) and the very beginning of Quine (1986). 
2 The alliance has had considerable success, and produced much debate, comment and literature. And a new 
holistic zeal has taken views surprisingly ascribed to our authors to remarkable extremes. 
3 Krips (1982), Ariew (1984), Quine (1986) and Vuillemin (1986) have pointed out several. Too many 
according to Needham (2000), who argues that Duhem and Quine share much common ground. 
4 Attention to both authors only means that, for all their differences, it is felt they can be fruitfully compared, 
and should not be taken as a charge of plagiarism. Quine’s originality is not in question. 
5 In other words “reductionism: the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical 
construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience,” as Quine (1953 p.20) puts it. 
6 Quine’s rejection of it has met with much disapproval; see for instance Mates (1951), Strawson (1955), 
Grice and Strawson (1956), Katz (1967,1974), Boghossian (1996). 
7 Similar claims, it must be said, abound in the literature, e.g. “A naive holism that supposes theory to 
confront experience as an unstructured, blockish whole will inevitably be perplexed by the power of scientific 
argument to distribute praise and to distribute blame among our beliefs” (Glymour 1975 p.426). See also 
Grünbaum (1960,1962)—Quine replies in (1962), Laudan defends Duhem in (1965), claiming that Grünbaum 
has attacked too strong a version of “the Duhemian argument”—and Glymour (1980). 
 A general theory of meaning is not being proposed. The discussion only concerns certain 
empirical meanings, and has special reference to physical experiments. Generalization is 
possible, in various directions, but will not be attempted. 
Duhem on mathematics, physics and crucial experiments 
Whereas Quine’s argument in “Two dogmas” is meant to undermine the analytic-synthetic 
distinction, Duhem’s corresponding argument turns on a very similar distinction: over and 
over he emphasizes the troublesome ‘synthetic’ character of physics by contrasting it with 
the clean necessity of mathematics8—in which analytic truths are generally held to figure 
conspicuously, indeed paradigmatically.9
 La réduction à l’absurde, qui semble n’être qu’un moyen de réfutation, peut devenir une 
méthode de démonstration ; pour démontrer qu’une proposition est vraie, il suffit d’acculer à 
une conséquence absurde celui qui admettrait la proposition contradictoire de celle-là ; on sait 
quel parti les géomètres grecs ont tiré de ce mode de démonstration. 
 Ceux qui assimilent la contradiction expérimentale à la réduction à l’absurde pensent 
qu’on peut, en Physique, user d’un argument semblable à celui dont Euclide a fait un si 
fréquent usage en Géométrie.10
Needless to say Duhem then explains how mistaken they are. A few pages later: 
 Mais admettons, pour un instant, que, dans chacun de ces systèmes, tout soit forcé, tout 
soit nécessaire de nécessité logique, sauf une seule hypothèse ; admettons, par conséquent, 
que les faits, en condamnant l’un des deux systèmes, condamnent à coup sûr la seule 
supposition douteuse qu’il renferme. En résulte-t-il qu’on puisse trouver dans l’experimentum 
crucis un procédé irréfutable pour transformer en vérité démontrée l’une des deux hypothèses 
en présence, de même que la réduction à l’absurde d’une proposition géométrique confère la 
certitude à la proposition contradictoire ? Entre deux théorèmes de Géométrie qui sont 
contradictoires entre eux, il n’y a pas place pour un troisième jugement ; si l’un est faux, 
l’autre est nécessairement vrai.11
But of course physics is not so straightforward. Further on: 
 La contradiction expérimentale n’a pas, comme la réduction à l’absurde employée par les 
géomètres, le pouvoir de transformer une hypothèse physique en une vérité incontestable ; 
pour le lui conférer, il faudrait énumerer complètement les diverses hypothèses auxquelles un 
groupe déterminé de phénomènes peut donner lieu ; or, le physicien n’est jamais sur d’avoir 
                                                 
8 Cf. Needham (2000) p.109-11. 
9 Until the difficulties and paradoxes that arose around the turn of the century (and then into the twentieth), 
mathematics was a paradigm of necessity. See Helmholtz (1870), for instance, on the certainties of geometry: 
“Unter allen Zweigen menschlicher Wissenschaft gibt es keine [...] von deren vernichtender Aegis 
Widerspruch und Zweifel so wenig ihre Augen aufzuschlagen wagten. Dabei fällt ihr in keiner Weise die 
mühsame und langwierige Aufgabe zu, Erfahrungsthatsachen sammeln zu müssen, wie es die 
Naturwissenschaften im engeren Sinne zu thun haben, sondern die ausschliessliche Form ihres 
wissenschaftlichen Verfahrens ist die Deduktion. Schluss wird aus Schluss entwickelt ...” 
10 Duhem (1989) p.285. Also p.280: “Un pareil mode de démonstration semble aussi convaincant, aussi 
irréfutable que la réduction à l’absurde usuelle aux géomètres ; c’est, du reste, sur la réduction à l’absurde que 
cette démonstration est calquée, la contradiction expérimentale jouant dans l’une le rôle que la contradiction 
logique joue dans l’autre.” Quine may be in question, but not the indeterminacy of translation (Quine 1960, 
esp. §§12-16), in acceptance of which Duhem has been left in French. 
11 P.288. 
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épuisé toutes les suppositions imaginables ; la vérité d’une théorie physique ne se décide pas 
à croix ou pile. 11
So Duhem’s discussion of crucial experiments turns12 on a distinction which is at least very 
similar to the one disputed by Quine, indeed perhaps on an acceptance of the first dogma. 
Abstract tests 
The distinction drawn between mathematics and physics seems to rest in large measure on 
the peculiarities and contingencies of the particular experiment; but experiment of a more 
abstract kind can also be considered: 
Pour apprécier la variation de la force électromotrice, il pourra employer successivement tous 
les types connus d’électromètres, de galvanomètres, d’électrodynamomètres, de voltmètres 
[…]. Cependant, toutes ces manipulations, si diverses qu’un profane n’apercevrait entre elles 
aucune analogie, ne sont pas vraiment des expériences différentes ; ce sont seulement des 
formes différentes d’une même expérience ; les faits qui se sont réellement produits ont été 
aussi dissemblables que possible ; cependant la constatation de ces faits s’exprime par cet 
unique énoncé : La force électromotrice de telle pile augmente de tant de volts lorsque la 
pression augmente de tant d’atmosphères.13
An expérience here is not an individual real experiment, subject to the difficulties Duhem 
will raise later, in II.VI, but a class of equivalent experiments that all test or measure the 
same thing. Such an abstract experiment can be associated with the class of its 
implementations in the same way a Platonic idea can be identified with all its realizations, 
or a theory with its models. 
 There is a similar notion in Word and object: “We may begin by defining the affirmative 
stimulus meaning of a sentence […] as the class of all the stimulations […] that would 
prompt […] assent.”14 A couple of pages on: 
 Yet a stimulation must be conceived for these purposes not as a dated particular event but 
as a universal, a repeatable event form. We are to say not that two like stimulations have 
occurred, but that the same stimulation has recurred. Such an attitude is implied the moment 
we speak of sameness of stimulus meaning for two speakers.15
Both Duhem and Quine have in mind an abstract test—an ‘abstract’ expérience, a 
universal—with many particular realizations. It is in such tests that the desired cruciality 
will be sought. 
 One can first wonder about appropriate formalization, for the notion is nebulous and of 
little use as it stands. What the various realizations of an abstract test have in common is 
structure of some sort; it is in that sense that they all test the same thing. But “structure” 
                                                 
12 Only because Duhem was unaware that mathematics may not be so certain and ‘analytic’ after all, 
according to Crowe (1990), who argues that it shares many of the difficulties attributed to physics in La 
théorie physique. 
13 P.224; emphasis mine. 
14 Quine (1960) p.32. 
15 P.34. Quine argues, especially in Word and object §§11,12, that stimulus meaning does not fix meaning 
well enough for all purposes and criteria. But his reservations, which regard behavioural linguistics, need not 
concern us here, especially as his characterization of stimulus meaning is serving only as a hint and not as a 
foundation for meaning. 
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also stands in need of elucidation, for the ordinary connotations of the word will hardly do 
(Duhem and Quine, who speak of form, do no better). Specification of a means of 
description can clarify: of the many available ways of describing structure, the resources of 
set-theoretical axiomatization, associated chiefly with Patrick Suppes,16 will be used. In his 
language a set-theoretical predicate defines a theory, whose realizations are models, 
whereas here the predicate will identify an abstract test or experimental structure, whose 
particular implementations are again models. 
 Of course no recipe or algorithm is enough on its own to assign an abstract test to an 
empirical sentence, blindly and mechanically; judgement will be needed, no matter how 
comprehensive and detailed the theoretical prescriptions.17
 Though the models of an experimental structure can disagree, to simplify unanimity will 
be required throughout, in other words that they all produce the same verdict. It will then be 
claimed that such a structure (in other words the class of its models) represents a crucial 
experiment, which can significantly diminish the gap between mathematics and physics to 
which Duhem repeatedly alludes. Auxiliary assumptions18 admittedly have to be made in 
each particular model, indeed to connect the abstract test with the world, but they vary 
widely over the whole class. The unanimity of a verdict cannot reasonably be attributed to a 
conspiracy of the assumptions or theories peripheral to each model, extraneous to the core 
structure; it must be due to that common structure itself. 
 Grice and Strawson (1956 p.156) write that “two statements are synonymous if and only 
if any experiences which, on certain assumptions19 about the truth-values of other 
statements, confirm or disconfirm one of the pair, also, on the same assumptions, confirm 
or disconfirm the other to the same degree.” Their assumptions are replaced here by 
quantification, together with the imposition of unanimity: rather than making assumptions 
as to the truth-values of other statements, it seems preferable to quantify over all “other 
statements” compatible with the abstract test—in other words over all additional 
assumptions—and then impose unanimity. This may amount to a posteriori inference, 
rather than a priori assumptions, as to the truth values of the other statements. 
 The separation of essential experimental meaning from the accidental auxiliary 
assumptions (or “collateral information”) that only confuse matters is analogous to the 
differentiation of an essence expressed by meaning or intension from the accidental 
features also brought in by naming, reference or extension. 
 The Aristotelian notion of essence was the forerunner, no doubt, of the modern notion of 
intension or meaning. For Aristotle it was essential in men to be rational, accidental to be 
two-legged. But there is an important difference between this attitude and the doctrine of 
meaning. From the latter point of view it may indeed be conceded (if only for the sake of 
                                                 
16 Suppes (2002), for instance. 
17 The issue is delicate; indeed Quine (1953 p.38) asks “What [...] is the nature of the relation between a 
statement and the experiences which contribute to or detract from its confirmation?,” and has no simple 
answer (short of invoking all of science). 
18 One is reminded of the “collateral information” of Quine (1960), esp. §§9,10. 
19 Cf. Duhem (1989) p.281: “Le physicien déclare-t-il que cette erreur est précisément contenue dans la 
proposition qu’il voulait réfuter et non pas ailleurs ? C’est qu’il admet implicitement l’exactitude de toutes les 
autres propositions dont il a fait usage ; tant vaut cette confiance, tant vaut sa conclusion.” 
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argument) that rationality is involved in the meaning of the word ‘man’ while two-leggedness 
is not; but two-leggedness may at the same time be viewed as involved in the meaning of 
‘biped’ while rationality is not. Thus from the point of view of the doctrine of meaning it 
makes no sense to say of the actual individual, who is at once a man and a biped, that his 
rationality is essential and his two-leggedness accidental or vice-versa. Things had essences, 
for Aristotle, but only linguistic forms have meanings. Meaning is what essence becomes 
when it is divorced from the object of reference and wedded to the word.20
Meaning is in a sense stronger than reference, and emphasizes a quality or essence in what 
is referred to; reference just indicates a whole object, including accidental features 
peripheral to what is really meant. With physical objects the separation of meaning from 
reference can require a mutilation or violence that would undermine even meaning, thus 
producing a confusing inextricability.21 But experiments can be more amenable to the 
extraction of an essence or meaning from the various possible accidents of physical 
implementation. 
 An example will be useful. 
The Bell test 
If ever a scientific controversy stood sorely in need of experimental arbitration, the dispute 
over the foundations of quantum mechanics that developed around the positions of 
Einstein22 and Bohr23 certainly did (and still does). There have been celebrated efforts to 
satisfy the need; experiments to test the Bell inequality24 by Alain Aspect and others25 have 
been among the most spectacular and controversial attempts at empirical discrimination. 
But far from settling the debate they have given it new life and vigour. 
 The hope was this: Supposez (to follow Duhem) que deux hypothèses seulement soient 
en présence ;—local realism is either valid or not—cherchez des conditions expérimentales 
telles que l’une des hypothèses annonce la production d’un phénomène et l’autre la 
production d’un phénomène tout différent ;—Bell’s inequality is either satisfied or 
violated—réalisez ces conditions et observez ce qui se passe; selon que vous observerez le 
premier des phénomènes prévu ou le second, vous condamnerez la seconde hypothèse ou la 
première ; celle qui ne sera pas condamnée sera désormais incontestable ; le débat sera 
tranché, une vérité nouvelle sera acquise à la Science.26 But of course such conclusions are 
unwarranted, resting on assumptions that may be no less questionable than the principles 
supposedly refuted. Bell (1986) for instance “always emphasize[d] that the Aspect 
experiment is too far from the ideal in many ways—counter efficiency is only one of 
                                                 
20 Quine (1953) p.22. 
21 “There is no assurance here that the extensional agreement of ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ rests on 
meaning rather than merely on accidental matters of fact, as does the extensional agreement of ‘creature with 
a heart’ and ‘creature with kidneys’” (Quine 1953 p.31). 
22 See for instance Einstein et al. (1935). 
23 See for instance Bohr (1935a, 1935b). 
24 See Bell (1965, 1987), and also Afriat and Selleri (1998). 
25 E.g. Aspect et al. (1981, 1982a, 1982b), Clauser and Horne (1974), Perrie et al. (1985), Walther and Fry 
(1997). 
26 Duhem (1989) p.286. 
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them,” and “that there is therefore a big extrapolation from practical present-day 
experiments to the conclusion that nonlocality holds.” 
 Most attempts to test Bell’s inequality, such as those of Aspect et al., have involved 
photons, but these are seldom detected; this is the issue of “counter efficiency” referred to 
by Bell. To violate a Bell inequality with photons, assumptions like “Given a pair of 
photons emerging from two regions of space where two polarizers can be located, the 
probability of their joint detection from two photomultipliers […] does not depend on the 
presence and the orientation of the polarizers”27 or “The set of detected pairs with a given 
orientation of the polarizers is an undistorted representative sample of the set of pairs 
emitted by the source”28 have to be made. For our purposes they are equivalent, and give 
rise to the same consequences: they multiply the interval figuring in the inequality by the 
product of the efficiencies of the counters. The assumptions turn an interval running from 
 to 1,  for instance, into one running from 1 2  to 1 2  where 1η  and 2η  are the 
efficiencies. If the counters are relatively efficient, and each detect, say, a photon in four, 
the assumptions make the inequality sixteen times easier to violate.
1− η η− ,η η
29
 This is the idea: Averaging involves adding up N  terms, then dividing by  But what 
if most of the terms are ‘duds,’ and do not contribute to the sum? Surely dividing by N  is 
excessive; does it not make more sense to divide by the number of valid terms instead? In 
other words only a small fraction of the pairs get detected, so why not take that same 
fraction of the interval? After all, why should the sample not be representative of the whole 
population? Surely the photomultipliers act randomly and indiscriminately … 
.N
 A sample that is almost the size of the whole population will clearly be very 
representative; a much smaller sample may or may not be. Consider the following 
assumption: “For every photon in the state λ  the probability of detection with a polarizer 
placed on its trajectory is less than or equal to the detection probability with the polarizer 
removed.”30 The trouble is that the polarizer might increase the probability of detection, 
especially if that probability depends on the state  which could be altered by the 
polarizer. Take the following example. The term ‘detector’ will denote both a vertically 
aligned polarizer  and a photomultiplier ϕ  behind it. A ‘detection’ therefore involves 
both objects that make up the detector  a photon is detected when it gets through  
and makes  click. As horizontally polarized light will never get detected by —its 
probability of detection vanishes—an oblique polarizer placed in front of  increases the 
probability of detection. 
,λ
π
:π ϕ+
                                                
π
ϕ π ϕ+
π
 So if the experiment produces a number lying outside the narrow interval running from 
 to  what is to be concluded? 1 2 1 2
 Uncertainties concerning the particular additional assumptions made vitiate 
comprehensive statements an experiment may inspire, like “Bell’s inequality is violated in 
nature.” Who knows if the experiment really means that—and not the unfoundedness of 
η η− ,η η
 
27 Clauser et al. (1969). 
28 Aspect (1983). 
29 Franco Selleri expresses this by distinguishing between strong and weak inequalities, which are described 
in Selleri and Lepore (1990), Afriat and Selleri (1998) and Afriat (2001). 
30 Clauser and Horne (1974). 
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this or that additional assumption instead. If kaons are used rather than photons, probability 
of detection, being very high, is no longer the issue; but their instability leads to other 
assumptions31 of a completely different sort; and so on. Hence the abstract test, and the 
corresponding class of structurally equivalent experiments, with a whole range of different 
auxiliary assumptions: surely they cannot all be wrong. 
 Turning to the experimental structure32 itself, a Bell test will be a scheme 
( ), ( ), ( ), ; , ,s s sn nk k B BΞ σ Σ σ| 〉O  
satisfying the following axioms: 
1.  is a large ensemble of pairs of objects. ( ) ({ 1 2 1 2(1), (1) , , ( ), ( )N NΞ = O O O O… )}
2. Object  has an intrinsic property ( )s kO ( ) 1sn kσ =±  for every value of  .n ∈\
3. 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1
1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
N
k
B k k k k k k k
N α β α ββ α α β
σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ′ ′ ′ ′
=
⎡ ⎤= − + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ k  
4.  is accurately described by the quantum state vector Ξ
( ) 2(1) 2(2)1 ,
2
ie γ| 〉= |+−〉+ |−+ 〉 ∈ ⊗^ ^Σ  
where the |±  are orthonormal, and both Hilbert spaces  are two-dimensional. 〉 2( )s^
5.  where  is self-
adjoint and unitary, with vanishing trace. 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 ,B α β α ββ α α βσ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ′ ′ ′= ⊗ − ⊗ + ⊗ + ⊗ ′ s2( ) 2( ):s snσ →^ ^
6. Measurement of  faithfully reveals property snσ ( ),sn kσ  for all  , .k n
The models of the axioms make up the extension of the predicate ‘is a Bell test.’ 
 Leaving aside other difficulties—like the precarious counterfactual thinking required by 
axiom 6—which would lead us too far astray, the axioms are inconsistent. The notation 
adopted in axioms 2 and 3, with just a single subscript, tacitly expresses a further axiom, 
say 7, by suggesting that property ( )sn kσ  only depends (once  and s  have been fixed) on 
its subscript  and not on the subscript of the neighbouring factor. This allows us to write 
k
,n
1 2 2 1 2 2
1
1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,
N
a b b a b b
k
B k k k k k
N
σ σ σ σ σ σ′ ′ ′
=
⎡ ⎤= { − }+ { + }⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ k  
whose modulus cannot exceed 2, now for purely arithmetical reasons. But it follows from 
axioms 4 and 5 (and little else) that ( )max 2 2;B〈 | | 〉 =Σ Σ  from axioms 3,5,6 (&1,2,4) 
that ;B〈 | | 〉=Σ Σ B  from 4,5,6 (&1,2,3) that max( ) 2 2;B =  and from 3,5,6,7 (&1,2) that 
 So we have all sorts of contradictions. 2 B− ≤〈 | | 〉≤Σ Σ 2.
                                                
 One approach would be to view the inconsistency as expressing the tension at issue, and 
perhaps as representing a corresponding inconsistency of nature itself. Of course if a model 
 
31 See Afriat (2000, 2001). 
32 Cf. Afriat (2003a, 2003b). 
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is a scheme satisfying the axioms, both ‘model’ and ‘satisfaction’ have to be understood in 
appropriately weakened, generalized senses. 
 The contradictory set has the advantage of allowing us to choose which axiom(s)—2,4,6 
or 7—to blame, but it nevertheless remains simplest to make the axioms consistent by 
abandoning an axiom, say 4 or 6. Once consistent the axioms admit normal, classical 
models, in fact quite a variety of them, involving angles, polarizers and photons; or times 
and precessions generated by appropriate fields; or kaons and strangeness; and so forth—
each with its own peculiar additional assumptions. 
 Duhem’s misgivings are at least partially answered by such abstract tests, which, being 
mathematical objects in themselves (despite having physical models), allow physics to 
partake of the rigid necessity of mathematics, of much of it at any rate. 
Empirical meaning, synonymy and analyticity 
If contingent assumptions, peripheral to the core test, were the principal obstacle to 
empirical confirmation—and hence to the meanings, synonymy and analyticity33 that would 
depend on it—we have proposed a framework that reduces their incidence, and are now in a 
position to countenance sweeping statements like “nature violates Bell’s inequality, no 
matter how the experiment is performed.” An empirical sentence can admittedly base only 
a limited and precarious meaning on a particular experiment; but an abstract test gives, say, 
“Bell’s inequality is violated in nature,” the kind and definiteness of meaning hoped for by 
the empiricists. And meanings so solidly founded in experiment give rise to an acceptable 
empirical notion of synonymy, requiring no appeal to semantical rules or linguistic 
convention: two sentences are synonymous if both base their meanings on the same abstract 
test.34 Even if sentences 1S  and 2S  look very different, and appear completely 
heteronymous at first sight, it could be that they ought both to be associated with the same 
abstract test  indeed independently of any direct linguistic perception of a synonymy 
between the sentences; in which case synonymy is perceived only indirectly, a posteriori, 
once it is seen that both sentences have the same test. The assignment of the common test to 
the two different sentences can be psychologically independent of any prior linguistic 
intuition regarding the sentences; there is no reason why the common association of 1S  and 
2  with T  should be possible only where it is preceded by a linguistic association of the 
sentences. 
,T
S
 With synonymy we have a corresponding analyticity: 
[…] synonymy […] is interdefinable with another elusive notion of intuitive philosophical 
semantics: that of an analytic sentence. […] The interdefinitions run thus: sentences are 
synonymous if and only if their biconditional (formed by joining them with ‘if and only if’) is 
                                                 
33 “Once the theory of meaning is sharply separated from the theory of reference, it is a short step to 
recognizing as the primary business of the theory of meaning simply the synonymy of linguistic forms and the 
analyticity of statements […]” (Quine 1953 p.22). 
34 “Then what the verification theory says is that statements are synonymous if and only if they are alike in 
point of method of empirical confirmation or infirmation” (Quine 1953 p.37). Here something like the “if” is 
claimed; the “only if” would require further argument. 
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analytic, and a sentence is analytic if and only if synonymous with self-conditionals (‘If p 
then p’).35
With good meanings, and hence synonymy, Quine would presumably be prepared to 
concede analyticity.36
 In “Two dogmas” Quine characterizes analyticity in the following terms as well: “The 
verification theory of meaning […] is that the meaning of a statement is the method of 
empirically confirming or infirming it. An analytic statement is that limiting case which is 
confirmed no matter what.”37  What is to be made of empirical confirmation no matter what 
is unclear. “Whatever the world may tell us” or “whatever the experimental verdict” seem a 
little extreme, no matter how drastic the adjustments Quine claims he is prepared to make. 
In the scheme proposed here “no matter what” has a natural interpretation, and can without 
undue distortion be taken to mean however the experimental structure gets realized, or 
whatever the auxiliary assumptions. An abstract test is meaningful, and gives rise to 
synonymy and analyticity, if it produces the same verdict come what may, in other words in 
all its physical implementations. 
Final remarks 
A sentence, for Quine, can only be as analytic as the meanings involved are determinate. 
But he would presumably allow that it can be just as analytic as the meanings are 
determinate. And we have proposed an empirical analyticity based on very determinate 
meanings founded in abstract test. 
 Analytic sentences are, for some philosophers, those that are uncontaminated by the 
world and all its contingencies. Quine tells us that no sentence is altogether immune to such 
contamination. Perhaps; but nature’s pronoucements can be purged of their contingent 
impurities by an appropriate abstraction and quantification, leaving empirical verdicts with 
much of the necessity and certainty of those of mathematics. 
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